

OTTAWA JEWISH DIGEST AND REVIEW

. In a commentary on a recently - translated study of Arab attitudes toward Israel, Ron Nettler says Jews may be allowing their hopes for peace in the Middle East to cloud their vision of the of the stark realities of Arab strategy and aims. See page 3

. Eugene Rothman discusses the origins of the Arab rhetoric which is reported in the western press. He warns that the rhetoric embraces several myths which are accepted uncritically in the west. See page 2

. Jewish news from the world's press is reviewed. See pages 5-7

. The Ottawa Jewish Digest And Review is introduced. See page 8

The propaganda war goes on

Myth and reality in the Arab world

By Eugene Rothman

Until the most recent round of fighting in the Middle East in October 1973, there was no shortage of glib analysis or instant experts who confidently anticipated the course of events in that region. Now, just a few months later, only fools or prophets still have the courage to predict what will happen next. The experts and analysts appear to have retreated hastily to safer shores leaving their tattered reputations behind.

Perhaps the only certainty remaining after the Yom Kippur War is that the enmity underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict survived intact. If the shooting war has subsided somewhat, the propaganda war continues to grow in intensity and importance. It is on this battlefield that the Arabs, with the myths they have developed, are such formidable opponents of Israel. These myths, the essential weaponry of propaganda war, have proven far more effective than Russian tanks and planes ever were.

Generally, myths are an attempt to organize reality to take a fact that is perceived but not fully understood and to fit it into a pattern that is readily recognisable. For example, the Creation Myths begin with the fact of human existence and give that existence some understandable frame work - Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Man was and therefore his origins had to be explained somehow. The Flood Myths, found in most societies settled near a large body of water, were an effort to rationalise the often unpredictable and uncontrollable behaviour

"Language possesses a reality all its own ... By speaking of the deed the deed, becomes real."

of the waters. In any case, myths are elaborated to explain what existed but could not be comprehended.

The Middle Eastern view of the relationship between myth and reality is somewhat different. The Arab-Muslim civilisation, the region's major culture, has been accurately characterised as a highly 'verbal society'. The force of language cannot be overemphasised and in many instances the word is more important than the deed - at times the word replacing the deed. Language, therefore, is all-powerful and possesses a reality all its own not based on facts themselves but on verbal expression.

By speaking of the deed, the deed becomes real. The verbal nature of Arab society can be perceived from the very beginning of Islam, even during the lifetime of its founder. Muhammad's primary mission was not to carry out miraculous deeds as much as it was to bring the word of God - the written revelation - to the Arabs. The role of the poet and his words, even in pre-Islamic Arab society, were as important and as effective as the concrete deeds of the man of action.

In a civilisation such as this myths and mythology had a different function. The basis of myth was not the tangible reality that required explanation. Instead the Arab-Muslim society established a set of desirable ideals, verbally expressed, and then adapted reality to those ideals. In other words, the society did not seek to explain what actually existed, but rather claimed that the ideal it wanted to see and to believe was real.

The Arab-Muslim view of Jerusalem is an excellent example of how this approach to myth and reality operates. On the one hand, the reality of the Jewish connection with Jerusalem is almost flatly denied. Jerusalem as the historic capital of the "Myth here is used as a framework for organising reality, not denying it, a view traditionally accepted by the Rabbis.

Jewish people, as the traditional focus of Judaism, is dismissed out of hand by Arab ideologues and spokesmen because it does not fit the ideal pattern they wish to believe. On the other hand, the historical-religious importance of Jerusalem for Islam is given an emphasis that belies the essentially legendary nature of Islam's relationship with that city. According to the early tradition, Muhammad travelled at night upon his horse, Buraq, whom he tied to the cornerstone of the Temple in Jerusalem before he miraculously visited Heaven. Recent writers have begun to elaborate upon this legend and to claim that Muhammad actually ascended to Heaven from Jerusalem after his death. The reason for the myth about Jerusalem is to give added validity to the Arab claim to Jerusalem and to provide a religious-historical basis for that claim even if it does not exist in fact.

In a similar vein, Arab leaders have taken the religious concept of territory 'sacred' to Islam, a term traditionally used only for Mecca and Medina, and have expanded it to include all territory they now believe should be sacred. It makes no difference that the West Bank of the Jordan River was never 'sacred' to the Hashemite Kingdom, or that Sinai was never 'sacred' to Egypt. The claim of the 'sacred' nature of these territories for the entire Muslim world is made since it serves the desirable ideal of denying the Israeli position and strengthening Arab assertion in a political-religious conflict. Here too myth is not used to explain fact, but rather to give a false basis to what Arab-Muslim society believes should be real.

That reality can be claimed for something that is not founded in actual fact is made easier by the traditional Muslim view of truth and the value of truth to society. According to al-Ghazali, a leading medieval Muslim philosopher, lying is not evil because the act itself is inherently wrong, but, rather, lying is bad because it may lead to evil results. People, misinformed by lies, may act in a disastrous fashion, whether religiously or socially. However, if a lie leads to good consequences, then not only is it permissible, it is admirable. Examples of this are the widespread use of exaggerated flattery in the social life of the Arab East, or, in a different sphere, the common wartime claims of success when outside observers see only unmitigated disaster. It does not matter that the flattery is totally untrue, or that claims of overwhelming victory are but figments of the imagination. If this flexible approach to truth serves the desired goal of social harmony or important political aims, it is acceptable and for the Arab-Muslim society these myths are as real as measurable fact.

The ability to create these myths and to use them effectively has serious implications for the ongoing Arab-Israeli propaganda war. In the political arena, the function of these myths is to confound the Israeli position and to gain support from the outside world for Arab claims. Recent pronouncements by Arab leaders and spokesmen indicate the major themes in the propaganda offensive and the myths used to support these themes. Basically, these are the claims about the harmonious relations between Jews and Muslims before the intrusion of Zionism, the restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians, and, finally, the establishment of a liberal secular democratic state in place of racist and exclusivist Israel.

An examination of Arab propaganda since 1948 shows numerous references to the first theme the harmonious relations between Jews and Arabs in the Muslim world for centuries. The myth of a tolerant and universal Islamic civilisation that knew no discrimination is the key to this theme. Arab spokesmen then continue that it was only with the introduction of the alien racist ideology of Zionism that the traditional peace between the two communities was disturbed. The Arab myth thus sets up as reality an ideal model of a tolerant Muslim society with the

implicit intent of indicating that, if Zionism were rejected, the region could return to the peace that reigned before 1882 when the first Jewish settlers began to return.

With regard to the general view that Islam was essentially an open society, one should look at the fate of pagans who fell under Muslim sway during the great Arab conquests. The choice offered to them was: conversion or death. The view, so successfully argued in black Africa and in liberal circles in North America, that Islamic civilisation is colour-blind, is disputed by historians who point to the inferior status of non-white Muslims in Arab society, with respect to influence, social position, or marriage. The Arabian Nights, the literary masterpiece of medieval Islam, with its countless black slaves and eunuchs and its clearly expressed outrage over sexual relations between black men and white women, gives ample evidence of a less than racially tolerant Arab-Muslim society.

"... the myth of idyllic Arab-Jewish relations before Zionism is found equally spurious..."

Within this context, the myth about idyllic Arab-Jewish relations before Zionism is found to be equally spurious when examined closely. Restrictions on Jews in the Muslim world began already in the days of Muhammad and they were expanded by his successors, the Caliphs. Eventually every aspect of the Jew's life was regulated with a view to segregating him and making him, socially and religiously, a despised outcast. The examples of such restrictions are numerous: Jews could not defend their beliefs in disputations with Muslims if this meant attacking Islam; marriage between a Jew and a Muslim woman was punishable by death; Muslims were forbidden to convert to Judaism, while the reverse was encouraged; Jews were required to wear readily identifiable garb, black with a yellow badge, and special headgear: the home of a Jew could

not be higher than that of his Muslim neighbour; Jews were forbidden to ride horses lest this confer distinction upon them; the shofar - the ram's horn - could not be blown because it would emphasise Jewish worship; synagogues could not be built but only existing ones repaired; and, special taxes had to be paid by Jews because of their adherence to Judaism. The list of legal restrictions is virtually endless and their aim was to ensure a degraded second-class existence even for 'tolerated' non-Muslims. Of course such a state was idyllic for the Arab-Muslim since it assured absolute Muslim superiority. Any doubts about the continued existence of this approach in a traditional Muslim society are set to rest by the status of the Jews in the Yemen before they immigrated to Israel.

If degradation and restriction were the reality of Jewish existence in the Muslim world, what is the function of the myth of harmony between Jew and Arab and Zionism's adverse effects? It would appear that the desired goal is the restoration of a society wherein Arabs regain their traditional majority and superior status, with Jews constituting a small 'tolerated' minority within that society. Zionism and the State of Israel stand in the way of that aim, so the myth about harmonious relations before the advent of Zionism was elaborated in order to justify the rejection of Zionism and the end of a Jewish State. That the myth of harmony is false again is unimportant so long as it moves towards the realisation of the desired goal of Arab supremacy.

The second major theme of the propaganda war, also seeking the reestablishment of Arab primacy, is that of the 'restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians' usurped by the Jews of Israel. At first glance, the aim of restoring to a people - the Palestinians - the rights they had previously enjoyed appears reasonable enough. The rather vague references to this by Arab leaders such as Faysal of Saudi Arabia and Sadat of Egypt supports the moderate appearance of this claim. But, what in fact is meant by 'national rights' and how will these be restored? The late President Nasser, apparently less interested in a 'good press' than Faysal and Sadat are now, clearly stated the Arab view when he told an

A DAILY PEACE MESSAGE FROM THE SYRIANS



(From Ma'ariv)

Teddy Kollek plans Jerusalem

JERUSALEM POST, (ABRAHAM RABINOVICH)

March 5 — A few weeks after the Yom Kippur War with the Middle East still rocking from its impact, Teddy Kollek built a park.

It was a small park at a busy intersection opposite the Old City's Damascus Gate and its construction was the most eloquent political statement the mayor could conceive.

"I meant" said Mr. Kollek last week, "that we intend to stay."

The question of Jerusalem's political future, hovering obscurely in the background of the Middle East dispute for the past seven years, has recently changed some of the priorities fixed by Mr. Kollek last summer when he contemplated his re-election for another term.

The new park is an example. Its construction had not been planned for at least another year. The accelerated timetable is part of a significantly increased investment by the Municipality in East Jerusalem aimed at disabusing anyone who might get the idea that the city would be redivided again. "We felt these things have to be done quickly to show we're not leaving here," Mr. Kollek told me. "We wouldn't be spending all these millions if we were."

In this vein, work is to be speeded up on the national park around the Old City and the new East Jerusalem bus station in Nablus Road; contracts have gone out for new Arab schools; and a IL3m. infrastructure project is getting under way in the Moslem Quarter of the Old City.

There are changes, too, in the plans for housing. Before the war, Mr. Kollek had advocated a slowing down of construction in the large new residential suburbs beyond the green line, in order to permit resources to be shifted to infrastructure and social needs. After the war, he called on the Housing Ministry to speed up construction in these developments.

"We've got to double the rate of settlement in these neighbourhoods, not because it's politically important but because it's psychologically important," he said. "In the present circumstance we can't settle 600 families in the first stage at Ramot as planned. They'll feel isolated. We'll have to settle at least 2,000 families."

To find money for these accelerated programmes at this time will not be easy, but Mr. Kollek believes he can persuade the Government that it is in the national interest to do so.

Mr. Kollek remains opposed to building around Nebi Samwil on planning and aesthetic grounds. In this he is in conflict with Likud Deputy Mayor Yehoshua Matza, who expressed the hope at the first meeting

of the new Municipal Council in January that planning arguments would no longer outweigh political considerations in determining where to build in the city.

"That's a pretty simple conception of what a political consideration is," said Mr. Kollek. Settling Nebi Samwil is not only poor judgement from a town planning point of view but bad from a political point of view. I think more people in the world will appreciate us for keeping Jerusalem beautiful."

"Brains trust"

The Mayor is shortly to set up his own "brains trust" to work out contingency plans for Jerusalem within the framework of a peace settlement. It will include municipal officials and Hebrew University professors. The Government brains trust in Jerusalem, Mr. Kollek says, is dealing only with questions concerning the holy places and not with Arab-Jewish relations in the city.

Shortly after the Six Day War, Mr. Kollek suggested that a Greater Jerusalem, which would include Ramallah, could serve as a dual capital - of Israel and of a neighbouring Arab state. He has not repeated the suggestion publicly since, and declines to spell out his current thinking on the subject for fear that this would prove counter-productive at the time.

In any event, he says, it is impossible to be specific about Jerusalem until the shape of the overall settlement with the Arabs is clear.

"If none of the West Bank is given up, suggestions about Jerusalem will be entirely different from what they will be if the frontier reaches the neighbourhood of the Capital.

In the latter case, Mr. Kollek would be prepared, for instance, to see Jerusalem Airport made into an international airport, serving residents across the border as well.

"I have landed in Basle Airport, which is in France, not Switzerland," he notes, "and I could travel to Basle without going through French customs."

MR. KOLLEK favours a borough system which would permit the Arab population a large measure of self-government. He has already moved in this direction by appointing an Arab educator from East Jerusalem to be in charge of the schools there and hopes to follow suit shortly with a similar appointment in the field of social welfare.

"It's demeaning to get welfare. If you get it from a stranger, it's even more demeaning."

He also wants the Government to recognize the Shari'a religious court in East Jerusalem, despite the hostility of the Supreme and Moslem Council in the city, so that local Arab residents can appear before their own officials rather than the kadi of Jaffa, whose

jurisdiction was extended to Jerusalem after the Six Day War.

"These are the kinds of things we can do even before an overall settlement, in order to keep peace and quiet in the city," the Mayor said. "Whatever happens, we'll have to keep the city together as one entity. But there are compromises that can be made within that framework. We have to get away from paternalism and give the Arabs the feeling that they can run things themselves."

During his visit here last month, Henry Kissinger took three quarters of an hour out of his frantic schedule to sit on the terrace of his room in the King David Hotel and discuss

Jerusalem with Teddy Kollek.

"We looked out over the Old City and I gave him a few short explanations about the geography of Jerusalem, which is an introduction to the complications of the city. We both agreed that such an emotional issue should be left to the last, when some kind of climate of negotiations had been created."

They did not discuss alternative solutions. "The possibilities are fairly well known, but to talk about them with Kissinger is to start negotiating, and it's too early for that."

Although high politics may cast their shadow over the city during the four-year term Mr. Kollek has just begun, his main day-to-day concern will continue to be the social gap. The war, he feels, has made this gap more worrisome than ever.

"Young people coming back from five months in the army will be less patient in their demands for housing, not more," Government statements about veterans' rights to housing and other benefits have been misleading and mischievous, he feels.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS of an explosive nature are being created today in new neighbourhoods such as Neve Ya'acov, where families of sharply different backgrounds - new immigrants from Georgia and Bukhara, young Israeli couples, and large families evacuated from slum areas - have been mixed indiscriminately in the same apartment houses.

Mixed housing

"We've found that mixed houses don't work," said Mr. Kollek. "They cause unbearable tensions."

He advocates the policy used in the Lachish region, where different ethnic groups - Yemenites, Rumanians, Kurds - were settled in separate villages, with the melting-pot

principle limited to the regional centre, where the villagers shopped and went to school together.

In the new developments, he wants people from similar backgrounds settled together in three or four houses around common courtyard. He indicated that there will be a relocation of families along these lines at Neve Ya'acov.

The Municipality intends to make the new neighbourhoods as self-sufficient as possible, in order to spare the residents the long trip to the centre of town and to create a spirit of local community. Residents will find municipal branch offices, mother and child centres, health clinics and other services within walking distance of their homes. The Municipality has begun to appoint neighbourhood managers in these new areas to coordinate municipal services and to push the interests of the residents in cooperation with the neighbourhood committee (va'ad).


No precedent

There's no precedent for this post in Israel," said Mr. Kollek. "The idea was born of necessity. There should be at least one person to serve as our eyes and ears in these neighbourhoods." The idea of a semi-independent neighbourhood with its own manager might, indeed, prove a forerunner of the borough system.

Mr. Kollek voiced firm confidence that Jerusalem will remain united and the capital of Israel. He feels that great efforts will have to be made to maintain a climate of calm in a city where ethnic differences, social gaps and conflicting loyalties provide ample material for combustion.

"I think there will be lots of struggle, and some of it may be very nasty," Mr. Kollek said. "I'm scared of the tensions that could flare up. The recent fire-bombings (first of Christian, then of Jewish institutions) will get 100 times more publicity than all the good things we're doing."

"In administering a city, you have to anticipate people's desires if you don't want trouble. We try to do that with the Jews - in school integration, in solving transportation problems, in reducing the social gap. We've got to do the same for Arabs, like the sewer system we're starting in East Jerusalem. Political issues will take a good deal of thought in the next four years. But we can't let it be at the expense of social, educational and planning problems - not if we want to continue with peace and quiet in the city."



THE REGIMENT IN TOWN

by Sima Beged-Dov

Levi case causes stir as Arabs press Fiat

The Economist, January 12 — The Levi case, as it is already called in Italy, is a grotesque example of what some Arabs now think they can demand from countries in western Europe. The Arab League's boycott committee has asked that the editor of La Stampa, the daily newspaper owned by Fiat, and two well-known humorists who write for the paper should be dismissed. If Fiat does not comply within the next two months, all the company's vast financial interests in the Middle East will, it is threatened, be in jeopardy.

In early December the two journalists wrote a piece poking fun at Libya's Colonel Qaddafi. The colonel did not think it funny and a threat was soon on its way to the Italian government that unless the two were removed from La Stampa, Libya would break off relations with Italy, interrupt all oil supplies and take serious measures against Fiat. The message was duly communicated to La Stampa's editor, Signor Levi, who in turn passed it on to Signor Agnelli, the head of Fiat. Some days later the threat was backed up by the Arab boycott committee but with the additional demand that Signor Levi, who is a Jew and the Arabs claim, a Zionist, should also be removed.

The reaction in most of the Italian press has been immediate. Anger has been expressed not only because such blackmail is a blatant effort to interfere with the freedom of Italy's press but also because Signor Levi is a liked and admired journalist. Furthermore, he is considered to be objective in his views on the Arab-Israeli conflict and under his guidance La Stampa has followed a balanced line.

In contrast, the reaction of the Italian government has been slow and subdued. After a considerable delay it issued a communication drawing the attention of the Arabs to the freedom of the Italian press but adding that "the question could and should be

clarified and solved through the appropriate channels and in the spirit of the traditional friendship between our country and the Arab world". This pussyfooting underlines yet again the weakness of the Italian government in its dealings with the Arabs.

In part this is a result of the instability of the country's internal politics and the differing views held about the Arab-Israeli conflict both within the ruling coalition and within the Christian Democratic party, the senior partner in the coalition. The party's secretary, Signor Fanfani, is reputedly pro-Arab. The foreign minister, Signor Moro, tries for a balance line. The prime minister, Signor Rumor, keeps silent. The Republicans are strongly pro-Israel, the Social Democrats are moderately pro-Israel, the Socialists are moderately pro-Arab. In addition, the government does not want to tread on the pro-Arab toes of the Communist party.

Italian governments have dreamt of acting as mediator between the two sides but numerous efforts to do so, often with the aid of Tunisia, have never worked out. Nor has the goodwill shown to the Arabs paid much in terms of economic dividends. An agreement was recently signed with Algeria for the provision of natural gas. Another agreement with Saudi Arabia, oil in exchange for industrial goods, was apparently in the making in June when Italy was ruled by a centre-right government led by Signor Andreotti. But this was never followed up by the centre-left government that took over in July. So, at present, the Italians are not getting much for their pains. Nor do they understand what the Arabs want. For their part, the Arabs have now shown that they will escalate their demands at every sign of weakness.



ONE THAT WAS FORGOTTEN

by Sima Beged-Dov

'Maginot - line mentality' is casualty of last war

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NADAV SAFRAN) JANUARY 1, 1974 — Probably the most specific, important, and hopeful lesson of the war has been that centering on the relationship between territory and security — the rock on which past efforts at peace have foundered. Immediately after war, at the height of what we called the "militant" current, Israelis argued that the war demonstrated how vital the territorial factor was and how right Israel has been in insisting on very substantial modifications of the 1967 territorial setup. Where, it was asked, would Israel be today if it did not have the buffer of the Golan and Sinai — if, for example, the enemy had been able to score an initial advance of 15 kilometers not at Khushniyya in the Golan but toward Natanya at the "waist" of pre-1967 Israel?

Since then, Israelis have continued to hold on to this argument, but have simultaneously begun to confront the inescapable paradox that in 1967 their country did infinitely better with its "insecure" boundaries than in 1973 with its "ideal" boundaries. It can, of course, be argued — and it is — that in 1973 Israel had fallen victim to a "Maginot-line

mentality," that there had been an unwarranted failure of intelligence, that the Soviets had given the Arab weapons that allowed them to achieve several tactical surprises, that they went on to replenish their arsenal as fast as Israel destroyed it, and that in the final account Israel would have still won a decisive victory but for the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, each additional explanation or excuse could only point out more and more factors relevant to security, and thus drive an additional nail in the coffin of the previous Israeli attitude that had made a fetish out of territory. The sum total of the explanations could only underscore the truth that security is a product of a multitude of factors of which geography is one, but which also comprises technology, friendships and alliances, relative size of forces and so on — including alertness and aspects of the opponent's state of mind that can be reached. The explanations would also reveal that there is a measure of interchangeability between these factors, so that one could have less of one and more of another and end up being no worse off than before, if not better.

Dutch ambassador campaigns against sentimental 'myth'

THE JERUSALEM POST, JANUARY 22. Dutch Ambassador Gerrit Jan Jongejans on January 18 in Haifa launched a campaign to "explode the myth created in Israel" that Holland took its stand against the Arab oil embargo "for the sake of Israel". He also sounded a warning that public opinion in this country about Israel "is not what it was in 1967. There are now many factors and currents that are far from solidarity".

Speaking before the Maritime and Economic Club at the Zion Hotel, the ambassador pleaded for Israelis to refrain from turning their appreciation for Holland "into an orgy of adoration and sentimentality".

He said Dutch sympathy for the Jewish people and Israel did not date from the Arab embargo, but from much farther back — from the time Holland welcomed the

refugees of the Spanish expulsion, through the general strike against the Nazi persecution of Jewish fellow citizens in February 1941. But it was an illusion to believe, as Israelis were tending to, "that Holland deliberately challenged the Arab states in order to be on Israel's side, and is now bearing the full fury of the oil embargo for that principle".

"Holland for the moment is a victim," Mr. Jongejans said. "It did not deliberately choose the role of martyr, and so far it has not proved itself a hero. Not yet, anyway".

On the positive side the ambassador noted that, in public opinion counts, Holland topped Europe in its sympathy for Israel (72 per cent, compared to 55 per cent elsewhere), and he was "happy the oil embargo has not changed our attitude".

UNEF Chief impresses Israelis holds Jerusalem press talks

THE JERUSALEM POST, FEBRUARY 1. The chief of the U.N. Emergency Force, General Ennio Silasvuo, came to Jerusalem with his spokesman to meet with local newsmen and thus display his intent to be scrupulously fair in all his dealings with Egypt and Israel. The spokesman Rudolf Stajduhar, also held a press conference, the first ever in the capital by a UNEF official.

The gesture was not lost on the journalists present, and was consistent with the high marks General Silasvuo has scored with the Israeli officials and Army officers who have

General Silasvuo's task calls for deft and discreet diplomacy. He must tread skillfully and objectively between Israel and Egypt in the complex process of disengagement, and he must display tact and political understanding as well in the command of the multinational military contingents at his disposal.

In the pursuance of his duties he has shown more sensitivity to relations with the press than other U.N. generals who have served in the area, and this too should help him discharge his duties in the complex months ahead.

'... the Arab call for a secular democratic state appeals to the liberal imagination''

Egyptian audience in 1965: 'Our aim is the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian peoples. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel.' Thus, the goal is the 'eradication' of the Jewish State, as Muhammad Haykal, former editor of *Al-Ahram*, wrote in February 1971, to be achieved through the restoration of the Palestinians' national rights.

The new myth, the basis and justification of Arab action, is the existence of previously held national rights for the Palestinians. While I would not presume to question Palestinian aspirations for a national identity or even a national home, it should be asked whether in fact the Palestinians once possessed such 'national rights' as are now used as the pretext for Israel's destruction. The answer can be found in the centuries-old administrative fragmentation of the region known as Palestine to Western cartographers. The area was divided into small districts with the administrative seat often in Lebanon or Gaza. The entire history of Arab nationalism from the late nineteenth century until the First World War was one of a limited national movement attempting to overcome the obstacles of tribalism or regionalism. Thus, to speak of the 'usurpation' of 'national rights' once held by Palestinians is to fly in the face of historical reality. But, again, the absence of a factual basis for a propaganda myth in no way inhibits its use, since the purpose of the myth is not explain fact but to realise an ideal.

The final theme in the propaganda war is the Arab call for a secular democratic state to replace 'racist and exclusivist' Israel. This theme was developed specifically because of its appeal to the liberal Western imagination. It is based on two parallel myths: the first, that a state with a particular national-religious character is an anomaly in the Middle East; and, the second, that a secular democratic state as envisaged by the Arabs would fit the liberal mold of Western European and North American political thought.

As to the question of a religious-national ethos being unusual or unacceptable in the Middle East - a survey of some of the countries in that area, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan or Saudi Arabia with their specifically Muslim-Arab character, indicates that such states are the norm rather than the exception. In fact, while Israel sets no religious criteria for public office, the 1973 Syrian constitution requires that the Head of State be a Muslim, and the Lebanese President must be a Christian. If a 'secular' state were established in Palestine, it would be a dramatic departure from current practice in the area, or, for that matter, in Anglican England or Christian Canada.

The second myth, the democratic nature of the envisaged 'secular' state, is equally misleading. Basically, the term 'secular democratic state' is a euphemism employed by Palestinian organisations for a non-Jewish State; in other words, an almost exclusively Arab state. Since the Western mind, fresh from the horrors of the Holocaust, recoils from Arab calls for the physical destruction of Israel and all that that implies, a new and evidently more palatable phrase has been adopted. The Palestine National Covenant, the charter of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, spells out the full meaning of the new state. This secular democratic society would be open only to Jews whose ancestors lived in Palestine before the 'Zionist invasion' which began in 1882 or 1917, depending on whether the reader is a moderate or an extremist. What would happen to the rest of the Jews, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Israel, is left unanswered. Thus, the myth of a secular democratic state is simply a mechanism for realising the desired goal of reducing the Jewish component in Palestine and assuring Arab numerical superiority.

One final question remains to be answered: Why have these Arab myths, in effect distortions of the truth rather than its explanation, been so successful in the propaganda war? The answer to this appears to lie in the West

and in its mistaken perceptions about the Arab East.

The general observer in the Western world has all too often assumed that his own view of myth and reality is shared by the Arab world.

However, these two cultures had different historical experiences and hence their approaches differ radically. The West has adopted a pragmatic view of fact and reality possibly based on the mechanical needs of industrialised society. Chaos would result if myths and ideals were substituted for verifiable data when programming a computer or designing a factory. A view which apparently was not compatible with the evolution of the Arab-Muslim civilisation. Nevertheless, the Western observer continues to assume mistakenly and with a patronising ignorance of Arab society that there is little difference in the two cultures. Thus, Arab propaganda themes and myths are seen as an attempt to explain what is real and as such are taken as based on fact.

The next and logical step in giving credence to Arab myth is what might be called 'the mathematical doctrine of honesty and fair play'. Since the West mistakenly believes that all view myth and reality in an identical context, this means that when both sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict make opposing claims on a given issue, the truth must lie midpoint between them since both are seen to be giving different versions of actual fact. Rather than distinguish right from wrong, all too often a false ethical 'tape-measure' is used to find justice amidst conflicting positions. In the name of 'impartiality' and 'even-handedness' equal weight is given to diametrically opposed arguments and both sides are somehow judged right, or, at least, not all wrong.

This approach is supported by the spurious liberal position taken by the social sciences. Political scientists, historians, sociologists, afraid of the charge of bias, have taken special care to adopt a neutral approach to the subject they investigate. There is a meticulous attempt to look at both sides of an

issue without drawing sharp conclusions or making value judgements. When applied to a burning political issue this tendency has unfortunate consequences. The position that both sides should be looked at objectively so that truth may be discovered is transformed into the belief that truth must be on both sides. Again false impartiality replaces honest and critical judgement.

In conclusion, the Arab view of myth and reality and its acceptance by the West at face value does not augur well for peace in the Middle East. Even while both sides sit at Geneva, the three Arab propaganda themes have a prominent place in the current offensive. This simply means that, while tactics have been modified to suit new political conditions, the basic Arab goal of Israel's elimination remains unchanged.

What then can be done? The easy solution is to sit and wait for the Arab world to abandon its view, a vital precondition for peace in the Middle East. This has been tried for a quarter of a century and its failure was marked by four wars. It is totally unrealistic to expect such radical change to come by itself since the Arab approach is deeply rooted in that society's historical and cultural experience. Hope may lie, however, in the West, but only if the West can show a greater awareness that the internal dynamics of the Arab world are different - not better, nor worse - and that we all do not view events in the same context. Only when the West gives up its false liberal assumption that all think alike and act alike, can an external critical yardstick be applied to the flexible Arab view of reality. There is no guarantee that this will succeed where countless other efforts have failed. Still, if there is to be any hope of progress in ending the Middle East conflict, it must be tried and can be ignored only at grave peril.

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A Review

A profile of Arab attitudes to Israel

By Ron Nettler

In these days of crisis and hope for Jews, it is instructive and sobering, I think, to re-read Dr. Y. Harkabi's excellent study, *ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL* (Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1972; first published in Hebrew in 1968). For Harkabi is one of those rare individuals who have the capacity to see reality as it is and the courage and honesty to convey their perceptions to others.

Thus, although Harkabi has long realized that many of his countrymen in Israel and his spiritual relations in diaspora Jewry would (understandably) almost prefer that he play the role of the false prophet, crying peace, peace, when there is no peace, he has never acceded to their plea for self-destructive illusions; on the contrary, Harkabi has since 1967 continued the line of research begun in his book in a series of later articles which present to his people the sobering realities which emerge from his study. What is sad is that it becomes apparent now, post Yom Kippur, 1973, (and perhaps was gradually becoming apparent since June, 1967) that Harkabi's fellow Jews, those in power in Israel and more ordinary souls, at best paid lip-service to the truths brought to them by Harkabi and other sources while acting and planning as though other conditions obtained. This truth Harkabi presents to us in more than five hundred well-documented carefully argued pages which constitute the first, and still the only, comprehensive study of Arab attitudes to Israel. Harkabi's purpose, as he himself states it, was "... to collect the ideas which together constitute the attitude of the Arabs and mold their ideology..." (p.52). I shall try briefly to summarize a few sections of the book in such a manner that the general findings of Harkabi's research will be made clear, rather than to attempt in this limited

space to cover the enormous complexity of the whole.

In chapters one and two, "The Arab Objective in the Conflict" and "The Arab Ideology of the Conflict", Harkabi presents a detailed profile of the basic Arab posture towards Israel. The Arab objective, whether stated in an open and undisguised fashion or in a more ambiguous manner, has from the beginning been the liquidation of the Jewish state. This goal is seen in its explicit form in various expressions used by the Arabs to indicate their ultimate objective in the conflict: "liquidation" or "ending" (the expression used most), "wiping out", "purification" or "cleansing", "crushing", "eradication", "elimination", and so on (p. 2). Some examples of fuller statements of purpose, as Harkabi has culled them from various Arab pronouncements, read as follows: 'Arab unity means the liquidation (al-gada'ala) of Israel and the expansionist dreams of Zionism' (Nasser, at the Festival of Unity, February 22, 1965); and 'The Arab people will pronounce the death sentence against criminal Israel, namely disappearance' (Commentator on Cairo Radio, April 20, 1965, at 20:55 hrs.) (Harkabi, p. 2).

More ambiguous or slightly disguised forms of the goal are also frequently met with. For example, such expressions as "the liberation of the Homeland", "making Palestine Arab", or "the restoration of the stolen rights" are, says Harkabi, on the surface open to interpretation as either moderate or extreme goals; thus, "restoration of the stolen rights" could mean reintegration of Arab refugees into Israeli society or the liquidation of Israel. However, says Harkabi, the contexts in which such expressions appear make it clear that the ex-

treme sense is the one usually meant, and that in the case of "restoration of stolen rights", for example, "it is not a matter of

the return of the refugees to Israeli territory but the return of Israeli territory to the refugees". (p. 7).

You want me to press? Give me gas.



"...liquidation is the aim behind the innocent expression of return to normalcy."

Another kind of indirect or ambiguous expression of their goal is the Arabs' repeated call for Israeli compliance with U.N. resolutions; for one might ask, if the Arabs call upon Israel to make such adjustments, is such a call perhaps not an indication of Arab willingness to live with a more tractable Jewish State? Harkabi answers here, on his analysis of these Arab requests, that such an approach gives the basic Arab goal some flexibility and a facade of reasonableness for presentation at the world body, without in fact necessitating any substantial change in objective. For in this way, "The Arabs are thus enabled to present a reasonable demand for 'some concession' by Israel, which the international community has approved, and if such a concession involves the liquidation of Israel, that is not their fault" (p. 21). The reason for the dual direct and indirect form of the Arabs' expression of their goal, according to Harkabi, is linked to shifts in internal moral and outlook, high morale giving rise to more direct expression while low morale creates a superficial softening and "living low". Additionally, it sometimes reflects Arab unease about fully expressing their goal to an outside world where such expression might encounter difficulties of acceptance. Thus, "One would hardly suspect, for instance, that liquidation is the aim which hides behind such an innocent expression as 'the restoration of the position to one of normalcy' - which Nasser used in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. In a world of tribulations and abnormalities who would refuse to support the restoration of normalcy?" (p. 15). Finally, Harkabi asks, does the Arab goal of the liquidation of the Jewish State or Zionist sovereignty ("politicide") imply also liquidation of the inhabitants ("genocide"). He answers that in this situation in practical terms "there may be no absolute distinction between politicide and genocide" (p. 15), for the Israelis who know what would await their defeat in a war would fight to the death "and that their overthrow and the liquidation of their state would, therefore, involve a massacre". The Arabs also know this. Thus, it is unnecessary for Arab leaders always to spell out their genocidal intentions, and those who are squeamish can talk in terms of severely limiting the size of the Jewish population in Palestine after that land has regained its Arab identity. But even so, explicit genocidal motifs are not absent from Arab statements and some even serve as recurrent themes (e.g., the expression "to throw the Jews into the sea").

An ideology

The Arabs' attempt to explain and justify their goals and methods constitutes their ideology of the conflict as this ideology is presented to the Arab peoples and to the West for purposes of propaganda and indoctrination. In a more specific sense, ideology here means the systematic intellectual aspect of the attitude, an official "doctrine" which claims to reflect great historical truths to secure the support of the people. As regards Israel, Arab ideology is of two kinds: (1) that which defines the nature of the conflict and justifies the aim of liquidating Israel; (2) that which discusses the nature of Zionism, Jews, Israel, and the Arabs themselves. I shall give some samples of this material as Harkabi presents it.

Arab ideology in general justifies its goal of liquidation of Israel on the grounds that "Israel was created through an appalling crime, and all its history is a chain of actions which are a profanation of the sanctities of international morality" (p. 61). Thus, for a crime of such magnitude - Nasser often referred to Israel's establishment as the greatest crime in human history - any solution short of liquidation must be seen as being inadequate. In accordance with this notion, Arab ideology excludes Israel from the right to "sovereignty" and territorial integrity of states granted by the U.N. Charter. The criminal Zionist entity, having already liquidated the Arabism of Palestine and by virtue of this crime deserving itself to be liquidated, threatens further aggression against innocent Arab victims and further expansion into the Arab homeland. For Zionism is by nature expansionist and would never be

content with the fruits of its original sin even should the Arabs agree to the unthinkable and allow Israel to exist in peace. Zionism is based on an irresistible drive to restore the biblical promised boundaries, and "is a new manifestation of the ancient aspiration for the land of Israel promised in the Bible" (p. 75). Harkabi quotes here from a book by Aluba, a prominent Arab writer on the subject: "Their religion urges them to acquire the area from the Euphrates to the Nile." Muhammad Ali Aluba, *PALESTINE AND THE CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND*, Cairo, March, 1964, p. 77; Harkabi, p. 75). However, certain strains of Arab ideology hold that even promised Biblical boundaries are only the first step for an insatiable Zionism whose true ultimate goal is to dominate the world. In this view, "Israel is only a point of concentration and a springboard" (p. 82) the Protocols of the Elders of Zion being used to establish the case. The notion of peace with such a dangerous criminal entity is, of course, out of the question, and although Arab ideology supports the general quest for peace in the world and better relations among peoples, it consistently excludes Israel from this goal, since the war against Israel, as part of the larger war against evil and imperialism, is a just struggle. For peace cannot be based on injustice. Peace can be established only after the basic wrong has been righted. "This attitude leads to the p the paradoxical result that what is meant is not 'a just peace with Israel' but 'a just peace without Israel'. In this case, reconciliation with the rival is predicated on his disappearance" (p. 106). One could summarize and discuss more aspects of the Arab ideology as Harkabi presents them, but I think its main lines are now clear. At this point, before proceeding to a general summing up, I should like to discuss one of the subsequent chapters in which Harkabi talks about various outlooks which go into the making of the Arab ideology. In this case attitudes towards Jews and Judaism.

Arab Anti-Semitism

In chapter five, "The Jews", Harkabi discusses Arab anti-Semitism, its origins and present characteristics. First, Harkabi dismisses the myth, widespread in the West, that historically Jews in the Muslim world lived in peace and harmony in a society which not only tolerated them but considered them the human equals of the ruling Muslims. Harkabi quite rightly asserts here that although Jews were not singled out as the prime scapegoat in the Muslim world and that their existence itself was not seen, as it was in the Christian world, as an anomaly and violation of God's will, the Qur'anic and later Muslim thought held Jews to be a degraded and wretched group who had long ago falsified and distorted their revelation to such an extent that their existence can now be no more than a proof of their wretchedness. Thus, Muslim attitudes towards Jews traditionally held, in accordance with this Qur'anic theory, that Jews as such a people be allowed to live as a tolerated scriptural minority in the Muslim world in return for which the Jews would have to pay a substantial tax. This toleration, as Harkabi rightly points out, did mean equality of status and respect for Jews; on the contrary, the various restrictions imposed upon the Jews and the view of them as humiliated and degraded people assured for them at best a tradition of uncomfortable second-class status and at worst (periodically) pogroms, whenever the political wind blew in that direction. Thus, although this position for the Jews did not lead to their extermination over the centuries as in the Christian world and this is a difference not to be taken lightly - it also did not make Jewish existence in the Muslim world dignified and secure (pp. 218-228). In modern times, since Jewish settlement began in Palestine, and more rapidly since 1948, Arab ideologists have had to supplement this traditional view of the Jew as wretched and humiliated with a view of the Jew as a powerful and evil danger to the Arabs and all mankind. For the traditional views with their emphasis on Jewish weakness and degradation and their recognition of the absence of any real Jewish

political power held only the seeds of such a notion. Thus, modern Arab ideologies, using many of the traditional Western anti-Semitic ideas of the Jew as danger to the world and emphasizing certain aspects of the traditional Islamic attitude, have constructed an anti-Semitic ideology which is second to none in its viciousness. For example, Judaism and Zionism are seen as a conspiracy for world domination, the proof for this conspiratorial nature being taken from the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion (pp. 229-237). Jews are basically vile and evil and have as their goal to enslave other peoples, a goal which they strive after through cunning and deceit, two fundamental qualities of their nature. So "The Jews... are not really persecuted, but only cunningly pretend to be so" (p. 249) in order to evoke world sympathy which will enable them to achieve their goal of world domination. However, when the record of history does incontrovertibly show that Jews were indeed the victims of extensive persecution, the Arab ideologists argue that such is just punishment for a people whose nature is so evil and whose danger to the world is so great. In Arab ideology, then, Nazi crimes are not only justified in this way but are applauded as noble acts.

Open letter

I shall end this account with Harkabi's translation of an "Open Letter to Eichmann" published in the Jordanian English language daily, "Jerusalem Times" on April 24, 1961:

"Dear Eichmann,

"I address you in your glass cell to extend a word of sympathy in your present plight. German genius that has invented Sputniks and missiles and all sorts of things has failed to inspire you to avert the disaster that has befallen you.

What a pity Eichmann that you allowed those swine to arrest you and stage their drama. But don't worry Eichmann it will in the end fall on their heads.

Lissen Eichmann you are accused to dissimulating (sic) six million of this breed. Whether this is correct or not it is not our object to debate this issue but what we like to say is this: if you actually managed to liquidate six million of them and if the remaining six million have been instrumental in inflicting so much havoc and suffering on the Arabs and disorganizing them from their homes we wonder what would have been the result if the dissimulated (sic) six million would have been allowed to survive.

It is likely that a similar drama would have been staged in another part of the Arab countries. So that by liquidating six millions you have minimized the extent of the calamity and conferred a real blessing on humanity, you can imagine dear Eichmann the feelings of the million or so of Arab refugees at this drama...

The object of this trial is simply to attract more tourists to the occupied section and to exploit it for fund raising and for skinning the rest of mankind.

But be brave Eichmann, find solace in the fact that this trial will one day culminate in the liquidation of the remaining six million to avenge your blood and the manner in which you have been kidnapped and brought to trial by the very same people who tortured and

ejected a million or so from their homes." Harkabi's profile of Arab attitudes will come as a complete revelation to some, but for most of us it will have the status of a reminder of things we know (although not in the fullness which Harkabi presents) but which we have pushed off into the most inaccessible corners of our minds. And this, it seems, was true not only for rank-and-file Jews but for many of those who made policy for Israel since the Six Day War. For it may be argued, I think, that since June, 1967 there was an increasing tendency among Israelis, and especially those who governed, to forget

Harkabi's reminders or at least to make light of them, on the grounds that such seemingly unremitting Arab hostility is after all "only" ideology and rhetoric which will have to fall in the face of a changed reality. Arabs one day will recognize that not only is Israel as permanent a reality as any other in this world, but that she now is militarily so powerful that they have no choice but to seat themselves at the negotiating table and make a permanent peace in return for which much of their occupied territory would be returned. And for the Arabs to attempt another war before the final day of negotiation would be "irrational" in light of what they now understand (apparently, Golda Meir on hearing of the Arab attack on Yom Kippur referred to it as a "lunatic" act).

But in what way is the Arabs' attempt to implement their ideology irrational? On the contrary, it is quite rational if by rational we mean consistency in belief and act and between belief and act: indeed, it would have been far more irrational of the Arabs had they not attacked again. Israelis, awed by the magnitude and implications of Arab hatred, preferred to believe that the Arab ideological pronouncements, although perhaps sincerely felt, were essentially thin and open to the light cast by the changing realities of our world. But alas, the ideology proved, and still proves, I think, to be fortress-strong and impermeable. Harkabi, in a postscript written in 1970 as an addition to the English translation (the original research was completed just before the Six Day War) asks whether there has been any noticeable softening in the Arab ideology of the conflict; he answers by saying that as yet he has seen no real signs of such, although, as he had stated in the text of the book, any ideology among any people is in principle subject to change due to internal and/or external changes in society, economy, or politics. Thus, perhaps one day economic progress, liberalization of society, or some such change in the Arab world (or parts thereof) might begin to erode the hostility towards Israel although, Harkabi warns, such changes also could conceivably strengthen the hatred. But in 1970 such signs were nowhere apparent.

How might we answer the same question today, with Harkabi's book before us and the aftermath of the terrible events of Yom Kippur still with us? In my opinion, and in this case I should be happy to be proved wrong, there has been no real change. For in spite of loose talk from various quarters (Israeli and others) about "a turning point in the history of the area", or "the best possibility for real peace in the last twenty years", and the willingness of Sadat and his small group of technocrats to send their generals to talk face-to-face to their Israeli counterparts and to attend Geneva talks and sign troop disengagement pacts, the Arab ideology still sounds very much the same, albeit with some public relations shifts to meet the requirements of the present circumstances. The current "soft" ideology presented to the West, particularly by Egypt, contains all the elements of the various ambiguous softer ideologies presented to the world periodically in the past. Thus, the three "nos" of Kharatoun, "no recognition", "no negotiation", "no peace", have now been replaced at Algiers by a "desire for a just peace" based on "total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories" and "restoration of the national rights of the Palestinians", which could mean anything from a desire for real peace with a living Jewish state, provided the Palestinians are given their own state and final general borders are agreed upon, to a situation which would make Israel vulnerable to a final annihilatory attack or social and economic deterioration within. The latter alternatives would be the final "peace without Israel" mentioned by Harkabi. Although one must never lose hope, Jews, perhaps more than most human groups, ought to have learned through experience that the only road to security lies in accurate perceptions of the world around us and comprehensive plans to manage any contingency which those perceptions tell us might arise. To disregard any part of what our perceptions indicate is to court the ultimate disaster.

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Wandering UJA bus returns from Egypt

JERUSALEM POST, (YITZHAK OKED)

March 5 — The UJA leaders whose bus strayed into Egypt-held territory in Sinai on Feb. 26 were as "calm and cool as any people I've ever driven in my 24 years behind the wheel," bus driver Baruch Genkin, 53, said.

The only excessive emotion came when the group of 27 American men returned to their hotel, shortly after two a.m. Wednesday morning. "And then, it was the wives who showed the emotion," said Mr. Genkin.

However, he noted, there had been a strong undercurrent of tension several times. The first time was when the Egyptian soldiers were arguing with the Israelis and the U.N. officers if they were in Israel, in Egypt, or in U.N.-occupied territory.

And while the argument was going on, the UJA members climbed into the bus to eat - and then to utter the "Birkat Ha-Mazon" (blessing of the food).

The second time was when they were blindfolded - after the Egyptians won the argument with the concurrence of the U.N. - and driven across the Canal to Ismailiya.

If anybody was nervous, it was Mr. Genkin himself. "The wheel was taken away from me by an Egyptian Lt.-Colonel who claimed he knew how to drive a bus. I was peeking through my light nylon jacket, which served as a blindfold, and that Lt.-Colonel managed to hit one side of the road after another, and

then to get one of the bus wheels stuck for a short time in the bridge over the Canal."

In Ismailiya, the entire group was handed envelopes and asked to place their personal effects and papers in them.

(All the Americans received their papers and other effects back, but not the Israelis, and, apparently, the Lt.-Colonel now has a driving licence - an Israeli one, according to Mr. Genkin.)

In Ismailiya, the group was treated courteously to sandwiches of cheese or jam, and given Coca-Cola to drink.

Each one of the group was then questioned. The Americans were asked (in English) about the composition and tasks of the UJA, how many UJA missions reached Israel each year and exactly how the UJA goes about raising money. The interrogators also showed a keen interest in how many immigrants were arriving from Russia each year.

The questions to the Israelis - the driver, the guide and a liaison officer - dealt more with military problems and the chances of peace.

"The Egyptians had a Hebrew-speaking interpreter. Only once did my interrogator lose his temper - and this was when I couldn't tell him how many bases the Israel Defence Forces had in Sinai," Mr. Genkin said. "I told him: I keep my eyes on the road when I'm driving, so I can't count the bases. He didn't like this answer, and he roared at me: 'Don't forget, you're a prisoner here.' But then he calmed down."

Towards evening, the military head of the

Ismailiya area told them that Egypt wanted peace and that they were soon to be released. It was not certain that the release included the Israelis as well, but the "Americans began whispering among themselves that they would refuse to leave without us," Mr. Genkin said.

He didn't know if this had any effect on the Egyptians, or if the release had been intended for all the group, but at any rate, they were all presented with a coloured booklet in Hebrew called the "October War - the War of Arab Liberation."

Then they were put back on the bus again and driven by the same Egyptian Lt.-Colonel - "whose driving had not improved one bit in the meanwhile" - back to the Israeli lines.

The inadvertent crossing occurred after the group, taken on a tour of the Sinai frontlines "in order to better understand the financial burdens shouldered by the State" stopped to have their picture taken near UNEF buffer zone checkpoint on the Tassa-Ismailiya road.

Since the bus was unable to turn around at this point on the road - enclosed on both sides by high, shifting sand dunes - the driver secured UNEF permission to head eastwards, to find some place where he could turn.

In doing so he must have overshot the eastern confines of UNEF zone and driven into the demilitarized Egyptian sector. There the bus was stopped.

Under the terms of the dis-engagement agreement, both sides have undertaken to return the same day, all civilians straying across the line.

BRIEFS

Omar Sharif picks Israelis for bridge

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL JANUARY 15 — Egyptian movie star and bridge champion Omar Sharif is doing his bit to help bridge the differences between his country and Israel.

Sharif has chosen Israel's leading players Mori Stampf and Adrian Schwartz as teammates for this month's Cutty Sark international bridge tour of Britain, the organizers announced Thursday.

Special security measures will be taken in view of Sharif's "provocative choice of colleagues", a spokesman for the sponsors said.

Brazil's position on conflict unchanged

JERUSALEM POST, FEBRUARY 12 — Brazil's stand on the Middle East conflict remained unchanged, contrary to agency press reports last weekend, that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had "for the first time openly come out in support of the Arab case," political sources in Jerusalem said last week.

The reports from Brasilia had referred to a speech by Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa at a reception for visiting Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Naffah. The Jerusalem sources said a study of the speech showed that Mr. Barbosa continued to subscribe to Security Council resolution 242 without any detailed reference to borders, and that it represented no departure from a joint Barbosa-Eban statement last Oct.

Oil squeeze illegal says Columbia prof

BRIEF, JANUARY, 1974 — Professor Richard N. Gardner, a Columbia University Law School expert on international law and a high State Department official in the Kennedy Administration says that the Arab oil squeeze violated a unanimously declared United Nations resolution on international law, adopted in 1970 with strong Arab backing.


The resolution states in part: "No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise over its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind."

Homelands all reject Israel, ten Africans still complete course

JERUSALEM POST, FEBRUARY 12 — Ten Africans — all from lands which have broken diplomatic relations with Israel — were among the 23 overseas students who have completed a post-graduate course in regional planning in Rehovot.

Thirteen countries were represented at the 10-month course, given at the Settlement Study Centre. They included Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Kenya. Despite the war and their countries' rupture of relations with Israel, all the Africans had stayed on till the end, Professor Shmuel Horowitz, director of the course, told The Post.

Meanwhile, 15 Asians last week began a three-week seminar in Transfer of Technology in Developing Countries at Herzliya's Tadmor Hotel. More participants are expected over the weekend. The seminar had originally been planned for October. It is sponsored by the Foreign Ministry and the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.



UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS by Sima Beget-Dov


OTTAWA JEWISH DIGEST AND REVIEW

This is the first edition of **The Ottawa Jewish Digest and Review**, a publication which the editors hope will become a permanent and important service to the Jewish Community. Sponsored by Young Israel Synagogue, it is published in the conviction that there is a desire in the community for information and discussion on Jewish affairs. Such information and discussion is not available in Ottawa's daily press. Nor is it available through anyone news agency. Accordingly, the editors will seek to monitor a number of international publications with a view to selecting articles of interest to Ottawa Jews. We will also include original articles. Publication is planned for the first week of every second month.

Editor-in-Chief Joel Diena.

All correspondence should be sent to:

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MECHANICAL MISHAP by Sima Biged-Dov